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INEFFICIENCIES OF CHINA’S FINANCIAL SYSTEM
Abstract
China has risen to the forefront of international scrutiny because of its unique
political and economic structure and evolution. The growth and development
of China as a world economic power has resulted from the political-economic
reform efforts of Communist leaders within China. Under Mao Ze Dong,
during the pre-socialistic modernization period, China began its reform of
rehabilitation from war time and social-economic restructuring by instituting
socialistic ideology. During the Dengist period under Deng Xiao Ping, there
was a transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy. After Deng,
socialist modernization reform has continued under China’s hybrid capitalistic
economic model, with particularly significant effects on the rapidly structured
financial market.

Entrenched with the within China’s hybrid capitalistic

economic model are the politically and socially inextricable characteristics of
which are based on generations of behavior.

Reform inefficiencies have

resulted from state enterprises that lacked control, financial structure, and
balance between state and private behavior. The evolving capital market
within China faced serious problems due to inefficiencies within state sector
enterprises’ financial system. Moreover, the banking system within China is
inefficient and poorly organized.

Problematic issues such as financial

institutions’ weak intermediary role, disorganization of financial assets, and
unstable lending policy has been masked by the public’s trust in the state and
political-social behavior of Chinese enterprises.

However, in order to

transition China’s banking system to modern practice, bank intermediation,
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capital asset balance, and foreign investment decontrol must be established.
Creating a modern financial system in China will rely on reforming behavior
as

much,

if

not

more

than

the

reformation

of

policy.

INEFFICIENCIES OF CHINA’S FINANCIAL SYSTEM

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................... 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE CAPITALISM ........................................................ 2
HYBRID CAPITALISM DEVELOPMENT UNDER CHINESE POLITICS .................. 4
SOCIALIST MODERNIZATION ................................................................................................... 5
CAPITALISTIC DEVELOPMENT & REFORM ............................................................................... 6
STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA’S HYBRID SYSTEM............................. 9
PRIVATIZATION..................................................................................................................... 10
FRAGMENTATION ................................................................................................................. 11
INDUSTRY INEFFICIENCIES .......................................................................................... 12
FINANCIAL SYSTEM’S INFLUENCE ON CHINA’S HYBRID CAPITALISM......... 13
CHINA’S BANKING SYSTEM ................................................................................................... 13
Role of financial institutions.......................................................................................... 13
Pre-reform banking system and early reform................................................................ 14
RENMINBI & THE CURRENCY SYSTEM.................................................................................... 18
Renminbi development................................................................................................... 18
Currency system reform................................................................................................. 19
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS’ CHALLENGES .............................................................. 22
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AS A REFORM TOOL ....................................................................... 22
Public sector impacts. ................................................................................................... 25
Banking profitability...................................................................................................... 27
Credit policy reform. ..................................................................................................... 28
Asset management & equity. ......................................................................................... 30
Improving competitiveness & foreign bank involvement............................................... 32
CREATING A MODERN FINANCIAL SYSTEM UP TO INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS ........................................................................................................................ 35
LENDING POLICY ................................................................................................................. 35
INTERMEDIATION ................................................................................................................. 37
MEASUREMENT AND TRANSPARENCY ..................................................................................... 38
STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE DOMESTIC BANKING ...................................................................... 41
CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................... 43
REFERENCES.................................................................................................................... 489

INEFFICIENCIES OF CHINA’S FINANCIAL SYSTEM

1

China’s Financial Institutions: Analysis of the Dynamic Changes and
Associated Inefficiencies Under a Hybrid Capitalistic Approach

Introduction
The dynamic transformation and growth of China’s economy have
triggered perplexing economic issues. At the center of the economy control
dilemmas is the matter of how to integrate changing social communist
government philosophies with a dynamic capitalistic environment so as to
promote the efficiency of China’s economic system.
China has shown explosive economic growth, even after taking
account of likely overstatements by Chinese national measurements. After
economic stagnation under Mao's Great Leap Forward of the late-1950s and
Cultural Revolution from the mid-'60s to the mid-'70s, China's growth rate for
gross domestic product per capita averaged 5 percent per year in the 1980s
and 8 percent in the 1990s (Barro, 2002). This performance brought China
from a per capita GDP of $700 in 1960 to the middle-income level of $4,300
in 2001 (Barro, 2002). As China’s economic presence has grown, concerns
about the effect of the Chinese government’s political-economic actions on
China’s economic system and its impacts in a globally expeditious world
market have risen to the forefront of China’s economic development.
Unlike many of its predecessors in economic reform, China has been a
relatively reluctant reformist country, choosing to proceed cautiously and
standing firm in face of foreign pressures to do otherwise. China’s relative
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insulation from world capital markets helped the country avoid economic
depression during the Asian financial crisis in 1997, when Asian economic
activity contracted, unemployment soared, bankruptcies were rampant, and
poverty increased (United Nations, 1999). From 1995 to 2001 China was able
to establish a 7 percent per capita growth, while many of its neighbors
suffered from the Asian financial crisis (Barro, 2002). However, to promote
longer-term growth, China will logically need to increase integration with
global financial markets.
Assessing China’s economic transitions reveal a badly fragmented
economy laden with many state sector inefficiencies.

Two decades of

uninterrupted market transformation and renewed determination to move
ahead in market reform have made China’s economic potential more evident.
Further reform on part of the government, industry, and financial system
within China is needed in other to realize the full benefits of trade and
investment liberalization.

In particular, this paper is an analysis of the

inefficiencies of the financial institutions and its practices since the
establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 that has prevented it
from realizing further market potential.

Characteristics of Chinese Capitalism
Chinese capitalism has been a revolution from traditionalistic
capitalism, embedding itself within particular political and socio-economic
contexts that can not be easily isolated.

Unlike American, German, or
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Japanese genres of capitalism, China’s has been a gradualist approach instead
of a direct push for capitalism, yet yielding unexpectedly swift results within
three decades.
Chinese hybrid capitalism has several key defining attributes. One,
Chinese capitalism is a particular social system of economic action and
business activities that manifests itself through complex webs of family
networks and personal relations. “Guanxi,” a term directly translated into the
word ‘relationship,’ has been used by many academia and professionals to
describe the prevalent social factor in Chinese business.
Chinese capitalism is organized and coordinated
via neither market relations nor hierarchies of
‘rational’ firms, but rather encompasses both
markets and hierarchies to configure capitalist
institutions through an informal system of social
relationships and family obligations (Hamilton,
2000, p. 56).
Second, Chinese capitalism is not bound within specific territorial boundaries
of nation-states. Dominance of ethnic Chinese in many Asian territories such
as Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia attest to the convoluted spread of Chinese
capitalism around the world.

Through centuries of distinctive cultural

practices and social organization, Chinese capitalism relies heavily on
distinctive economic behavior and social action among ethnic Chinese.
China, in essence is the base of Chinese cultural coherence and legitimacy.
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Third, Chinese capitalism lacks dependence on state structures and policies,
but relies on the key role of social actors rather than institutional structures in
coordination with economic organization. Much of this is a result of centuries
of corruptive practices within governmental and organized institutions.
Corruptive practices therein have reinforced the relational and personal
networks in Chinese capitalism.
Acceptance into the WTO and acknowledgement of China’s economic
potentials has placed China under scrutiny, particularly the culture of
conducting business in China that differs quite strikingly from western
counterparts. Many critics have emphasized the importance of establishing
institutional reform and regulatory statutes to stimulate behavioral change.
However, cultural change will need more than regulatory proceedings to
progress to the stage that some critics desire.

Hybrid Capitalism Development Under Chinese Politics
Chinese central government has employed a phased plan of
progressively increasing market forces and eliminating areas of central
planning. Under the plan, separate channels for development outside the state
sector, operating under different rules and conditions, have flourished. Hybrid
capitalism has two significances; one refers to the co-existence of state-owned
and private enterprises, the other refers to the mode by which Chinese
capitalism has transpired under cultural and ethnic influences.

Both

conceptions are interrelated by the co-existence of complex social interactions
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and institutional relationships among economic players. China’s capitalistic
development can be generally described as a phased process concurrent with
the different political leadership of the central government.

Socialist Modernization
Japanese invasion, civil war, and the consequences of these actions
had decimated the Chinese economy at the foundation of the People’s
Republic of China in 1949.

China’s economic growth during war time had

declined sharply from previous peak levels of 9.4 percent to virtually zero
growth (Lee, 1978).

Under the Communist leader Mao Ze Dong,

rehabilitation and reconstruction through collectivization of agriculture, state
control of industries, government organization of people’s communes, and
industrial mobilization of economic activity were pushed rigorously (Lippit,
1987). Between the period of 1952 to 1978 and through an unintentional trialand-error process, Mao established a large state sector regime. In an effort to
collectivize agriculture and speed land reform, Mao established rural
collectives and peoples communes. These collective units were also part of
Maoist efforts to decentralize state administration and weaken bureaucratic
power (Lippit, 1987). As a result, many private, household, sectors were
brought under state control but controlled through local governing bodies.
Mao’s vision for the new China incorporated traditional socialist
values such as equality, solidarity, and social welfare. Mao was, however,
extremely critical of the personal material gain that drove capitalism, and
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therefore resilient in disregarding foreign capitalistic ideology and foreign
involvement. Propaganda highlighting values of “serving the people” and
“fight self” encourage those in authority to refrain from using their positions
for personal benefit, and those out of it to stand up for social consciousness
(Lippit, 2000). These propaganda programs translated into some deformity of
occupational concentration and purpose. Intellectual workers ranging from
teachers to bureaucrats were pressured to take long durations of retreats to
rural areas and complete physical labor, having to divide their time of
academic study and/or teaching with that of field work (Cheng, 2003). Social
pressures, moral appeals, and collective emphasis, particularly with the
intertwinement of state and household industries during this period further
entrenched the overlap of social relationships and political networks under
economic environments (Riskin, 1987).

Capitalistic Development & Reform
Under Deng Xiao Ping, also known as the Dengist Period, the
structural and ideology revolution began. To fully lead China into social
modernization meant a possible break from the very ideology and leadership
of Mao. Hailed as the founder of People’s Republic of China and author of its
central body of doctrine, Mao was not only a prestigious leader, to many he
was the very icon of modern China (Z. Zhou, personal interview, March 15,
2005). The entrenchment of politics into civilian ideology and living customs
made reform and development difficult for “Dengists,” followers of Deng, to
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reform. Dismantlement of Maoist leadership and ideology needed to start
with rooting out Maoist politics, policies, and institutions, then had to face the
more challenging task of replacing old ideology with a new (Henderson,
1999).

In order to stabilize Chinese politics, Deng and his followers

dismissed harsh retaliation methods used previously by Maoists; rather Deng
chose swift, decisive, and strategic change of leadership and reform within the
communist party (Baum, 1994). Deng managed the dilemma of Maoist deentrenchment with great sensitivity.

In 1981, he finally issued a major

document criticizing Mao’s political ideas in relation to the Cultural
Revolution, one of the programs during Mao’s leadership that had met with
overwhelming social failures (Blecher, 2000). It was a refreshing change
from the Manichaean approach to problems that had stifled serious debate of
Deng’s predecessors.
Chinese economy relied heavily on its land resources and was largely
concentrated in agriculture and natural industries consisting of steel, coal,
electric power, and cement (World Bank, 1995). During the Deng period,
rural reform span spontaneously toward contractual relationships; a form of
bartering that traded land or items in return for a payment in cash or kind
(Blecher, 2000). The agricultural “household responsibility system,” which
were originally collectivistic programs holding households and respective
communes responsible for certain agricultural goals, grew increasingly
comprehensive and individualistic (Baum, 2000).

Swift pace of rural

institutional reform and some removal of entry barriers also spurred the
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increase of a new class of entrepreneurs in non-agricultural venues that helped
develop China’s prospective market-based economy (OECD, 2002). Under
Deng, enterprises were given more autonomy; enterprises were permitted to
make own decisions regarding above-quota output, and to negotiate selling
prices (Blecher, 2000). Rapid institutional and economic changes, however,
did not warrant a complete transformation of the basic political ideology and
institutional features of the Chinese political system and leaders.
Reform’s mixed results during the latter periods under Deng stirred
debate internally within the party and within the intellectual community.
During the late 1980s, there were an increase number of small private
merchants competing against state enterprises, depletion of foreign exchange
reserves, rise of corruption, and inflation; but also showcased record foreign
trade volumes, growing influx of foreign investments, and declining poverty
(Barale, 1989). Infamously known as “6-4” amongst the Chinese community,
the Tiananmen Square incident on June 4, 1989 and similar student reform
movements was the concurrent result from the period’s high economic growth
rate, crystallization of the political and economic systems’ boundaries, and
emergence of reformist optimistic and proactive opinion (Barale, 1989).
Fearful that inflation, crime, and intensifying tensions would destabilize and
destroy the economy, party leaders decided to take forceful measures to
maintain social and political stability. Chinese leaders were not ready to
relinquish institutional ideology and political structure.

These decisions

garnered much criticism, particularly under the media politics of the 1989
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student movement, portraying the government as a corruptive, unreasonable,
and authoritarian force suppressive of the masses. During the progress of
student protests, organization of unofficial trade unions formed within diverse
industries; and more increasingly under direct partnership with intellectuals
(Henderson, 1999). Socio-economic change had advanced more rapidly than
political and institutional change.

Dengists emerged from the late 80s

political-economic crises by enforcing stricter economic policy; slowing down
growth to tame inflation, and circumscription of the market (Blecher, 2000).
Tightened credit and fiscal policies served to curtail industrial investment,
while rural industries were closed or restricted by credit, tax, and regulatory
polices (Lardy, 1998). Heightened opinions, economic uncertainty, and fear
of losing control of civil society led the Dengist government to follow strict
restrictions on civil liberties in addition to their monopolistic rule of economic
transformation.

Structural Development of China’s Hybrid System
The reform years under Deng had created a combination of market
forces, state and collective ownership, entrepreneurialism, as well as
heightened tensions. Previously, China lacked the legal, institutional, and
governance structures needed to support an economic system based
predominantly on private ownership. However, with government’s reform
efforts and growth of individualistic behavior, and increasingly structures to
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accommodate such behavior, growth of private and market entities have
increased dramatically.

Privatization
Privatization of state-managed enterprises is a strategy to restructure
China’s economy and give empowerment to local governments in
relinquishing unprofitable and/or small state and collective enterprises.
Privatization has been crucial in restructuring. Chinese central authorities
chose a method of selling state shares, particularly to employees of stateowned enterprises, rather than free distribution of shares (OECD, 2002). The
strategy was carefully implemented through staged applications, with the first
large scale piloting in Zhucheng in 1994, a small city in Shangdong province
that generated comprehensive media coverage (Henderson, 1999). In 1997,
the Chinese government extended this practice to all the cities in China
(OECD, 2002).

Between 1993 and 1998, Guanxi province reformed 15

percent of the total number of state-managed enterprises in Guanxi, an
example of the effectiveness of the program in smaller regions (Chinese
Financial Annual, 1998).
State-managed and owned enterprises were transformed in various
forms, including changing into joint stock companies that the state remained
the largest shareholder, or sold to employees in a framework of the cooperated shareholding system (OECD, 2002). Less frequently, wholly capital
privatization occurred, usually with financially unstable companies, which
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were auctioned off at centers for the sale and exchange of state assets (OECD,
2002). Most of the state-managed companies that remained were in certain
high technology or raw resources industries that were considered strategic at
the national level (Lardy, 1998).

Fragmentation
Fragmentation of wholly and partially state-owned enterprises is very
prevalent in China. The practice of locally autonomous enterprises, in addition
to large state production units initiated under the Maoist period, has continued
to exist.

Thus, not only does each ministry under the Chinese central

government have its own enterprises, but each province, and sometimes each
municipality have its own production systems (OECD, 2002).

Large

percentage of these state-owned and joint-state enterprises is kept under
regional control and under diverse governing bodies; thereby making up a
highly fragmented industry structure.
Chinese private enterprises are fragmented by competition and
competitors more so than by goods and services produced, due to Chinese
businesses’ proliferation practices and government’s pressure to acquire
diverse loss-making state companies by capable private businesses (Lardy,
1998).

Private enterprises remain highly localized, though several have

established nationally and internationally through strong management and
ability to negotiate with the state and respective governing bodies (“The
struggle of the champions,” 2005).
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Industry Inefficiencies
The 1990s provided reform opportunities with its continued expansion
and economic growth, as well as shifting emphasis to private enterprises.
However,

massive

economic

problems

of

declining

arable

land,

unemployment, growing gap between rich and poor, and inflation related
directly to the shifting of state-owned enterprises to non-state firms (Benewick
& Wingrove, 1995). In general, Chinese industry is laden by two problems:
low pace of consolidation in the different sectors and the slow exit from the
market of inefficient producers. Increased burdens of responsibilities and lack
of appropriate resources were the primarily causes of the failure of many
state-owned enterprises (Lardy, 1994).
State-owned enterprises were obligated to provide broad range of
social services, which should have been financed from the government budget
instead of from individual enterprises, and employ certain number of workers
to meet government’s political agenda of maintaining low levels of
unemployment. Between 1978 and 1994, employment in state-owned firms
increased by 40 million (Lardy, 1998). Forced to stabilize employment rate,
and absorb a disproportionately large share of investment resources, which
were largely misallocated, many state-owned firms were driven into
bankruptcy. For these reasons and continued government pressure, financial
performance declined and many state firms, inclusive of state-owned financial
institutions, and were unable to service debt borrowed.
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Being highly fragmented, China’s industry sector lacked an
appropriate level of consolidation and standardization. As a means of solving
this problem as well as the issue of loss-incurring enterprises, the central
government increasing privatized state-owned firms and eased bankruptcy
laws to eliminate unproductive enterprises.

Financial System’s Influence on China’s Hybrid Capitalism
A large contributing factor to China’s hybrid capitalism has been the
financial system, which has both sustaining and constricting influences on the
liberalization of China’s economy. The banking system in China has been
prevailing as the central government’s institutional tool in sustaining reform
strategies implemented for China’s economic development.

Assessing

China’s economic transitions reveal decades of state-owned banks having
channeled civilian savings into unreformed, money losing enterprises,
resulting in a dramatic rise of debt in state-related organizations.

The

predominate reason why strengthening China’s financial institutions’ weak
and frequently inability to exercise appropriate control and prudential
supervision of lower branches has been difficult is because of the tight and
conflicting central government oversight on these financial institutions.

China’s Banking System
Role of financial institutions.
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Financial institutions, as an intermediary between depositors and
borrowers, serve multiple roles. First, banks provide efficient mechanisms for
pooling of funds from small depositors, obviating the need for firms to raise
funds directly from large number of lenders. Second, financial institutions
function in a way to alleviate time span inconsistencies between lenders and
borrowers. Banks can meet short-term withdrawals from other depositors due
to the large number of clients they serve. Third, lending to broad range of
projects diversifies risk better than if individual depositors were to invest
themselves.

Fourth, financial institutions accumulate valuable skills and

experience in evaluating investment projects in differentiated markets.
Finally, financial institutions provide discipline and enforcement mechanisms
by ensuring that quality borrowers are provided with lower cost of funds, and
low quality borrowers are monitored and enforced to amortize their loans
(Brealey, Myers, & Marcus, 2004)). In a fully conceptualized capital market,
both financial institutions and capital market can perform intermediary and
disciplinary functions. However, China’s financial intermediaries had not yet
evolved to such stages.

Pre-reform banking system and early reform.
Pre-reform China had no capital markets and banks did not serve as
intermediaries for two reasons.

One, the source of bank deposits in

developing market economies, household savings, was extremely small. The
Chinese national savings were mobilized almost entirely within the
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government sector, which were derived from profits of state-owned
enterprises (Lardy, 1994). Second, investment was financed predominantly
from interest-free budgetary grants, and to a lesser degree from the retained
profits of enterprises (Lardy, 1998). The budget, county and lower-level
governments were all sources of working capital of state-owned enterprises,
and therefore circumscribed the intermediary and disciplinary role of banks
(Jefferson & Singh, 1999). At the time of financial sector reform, China had
only a simple institutional structure consisting of a few banks and a network
of rural credit cooperatives, a form of informal financial institution tied
together by townships (United Nations, 1999). The People’s Bank of China,
PBoC, simultaneously served as China’s central bank, regulating money
supply, fixing interest rates, managing the state’s holdings of foreign
exchange, and supervising and controlling all other financial institutions
(People’s Bank of China, 2005). In essence, China had a mono-bank system,
which operated as the central governmental and sole commercial bank.
Unlike many developed financial systems, China’s central bank, PBoC, is not
an independent body; rather it is a ministry under the State Council of China
(Standard Chartered, 2001). By construction, it shares policy making power
with other ministries under the central government, if not directly subjected to
mandates of the State Council (OECD, 2002).

Banking reform: late 1970s to 1990s.
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China’s financial system grew more complex as reform underwent,
with new array of banks and non-bank financial institutions. Initially, new
non-bank financial institutions competed very limitedly because of small
capital and centrally set interest rates.

Having no mandatory burden of

financing state-owned enterprises, the new institutions had stronger financial
position and more efficient intermediation between depositors and borrowers.
Consequently, these institutions grew. During the late 70s through the 80s,
the Chinese government elevated subordinate banks under the People’s Bank
of China, and distinguished the banks from one another (Lardy, 1994). At the
same time, banks were authorized broader business scope, including the sale
of bonds on international markets (Huang, 1999).

Explanations for such

institutional changes revert to China’s increasing participation in international
economy, particularly its entry into the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund in 1980 (OECD, 2002). In December 1981, China Investment
Bank, CIB, was created to serve as the institution to control disbursement of
project funds provided to China by the World Bank, and later on for the Asian
Development Bank in 1986 (OECD, 2002). Disbursement power of the CIB
included foreign currency loans to finance rising imports of technology and
capital goods; and domestic currency loans to finance local counterpart
component of foreign-funded projects.
Beginning in mid-1980s, the People’s Bank of China became
responsible for issuing currency, managing credit, setting interest rates, and
supervising China’s foreign exchange business; signifying its growing role
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(Lardy, 1998). Comprehensive business scope of the four major specialized
banks gave other rising financial institutions little opportunity; thus the four
specialized banks faced few competition. To increase competition, the State
Administration of Exchange Control gradually approved increasing numbers
of branches of specialized banks to enter foreign exchange business (Huang,
1996). At the end of 1994, the central bank allowed for fourteen new banks to
establish limited branches, sub-branches, and organizational structures below
the sub-branch level (Lardy, 1998). Despite these allowances, the four major
banks have continued to dominate in the provision of financial services due to
the limited geographic mobility of the Chinese public and the limited
geographic location of the new banks.
China’s modern banking system is divided into three segments: four
major state-owned commercial banks, twelve joint stock banks, and city
commercial banks [see Table 1.1]. In 1994, “policy banks” were created to
take over non-commercial lending previously carried out by the commercial
banks (“China and the WTO: perspective on a changing environment,” 2005).
Policy banks function similar to development banks but have diversified into
more traditional commercial banking activities, specifically in public sector
loan services. Additionally, China has a postal savings bank, which takes
deposits but does not make commercial loans, along with a large network of
urban and rural credit co-operatives (OECD, 2002).

Credit co-operatives

networked across the country provides services similar to commercial banks,
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though many are not consider formal commercial banks under the current
regulatory framework.
Table 1.1

Source: Standard Chartered, April 2001
http://www.tdctrade.com/econforum/sc/sc010402.htm

Renminbi & the Currency System
Renminbi development.
Renminbi’s issuance dates prior to the establishment of People’
Republic of China in 1949. To unify and establish consistency of the currency
usage throughout China, the Government Administration Council of Central
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People’s Government called in currency issuances by the Northeast Bank and
People’s Bank of Inner Mongolia, as well as unified the Xin Jiang bank note
(Yeung, 2004). China’s existing exchange rate is a floating rate system that is
dictated by bank’s purchases and sale system (OECD, 2002). The Renminbi
was informally pegged against the dollar in 1994. It pegged the Renminbi to
the US dollar at around 8.3 Renminbi for every US dollar, allowing the rate to
float between designated ranges. The Chinese government firmly maintained
its exchange rate after the breakout of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997,
which made southeastern Asian nations devalue their currencies one-by-one
(China Internet Information Center, 2003).

Currency system reform.
Reform of the late 1970s included the reform of the Renminbi
currency through the issuance of foreign exchange certificate, FEC, to
represent a partially convertible currency for foreign use (Brahm, 1996, p.
120). This dual track currency system designated Renminbi-use to domestic
parties, while foreigners were forced to use foreign exchange certificates. The
usage was more specifically toward rationing consumer commodities,
particularly imports; consequently it provided avoidance of unnecessary drain
and leakage of China’s minimal foreign exchange reserves (Henderson, 1999).
During the 1980s, China’s growth economically indicated increased needs for
raw materials and technology imports. With the expansion of the domestic
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consumer market, the FEC became an institutionalized section of the
regulatory mechanism, until it was abolished in 1993 (Zhang, 1999).
Prior to the Asian Crisis, reform of the currency system involved the
Renminbi being staged at artificially high levels by the government. At the
onset of the Asian Crisis, financial trading system was liberalized to
incorporate two exchange rates, the official rate and the “internal settlement
rate” that was executed between the People’s Bank of China and China’s
foreign trading companies (Henderson, 1999, p. 86). Criticisms of China’s
two exchange rates were largely based on the allegation that the official
Renminbi rate was overvalued against the dollar as a protective measure to let
domestic trading companies obtain competitive leverage over foreign trading
partners. The dramatic increase of consumerism in the 1980s, generated a
trade balance in favor of imports, drained foreign exchange reserves.
Following the import increases, the government devalued the Renminbi in
attempts to higher export and increases the cost of imports (Lardy, 1998).
Regulations to sustain balance coincided with a drop of internal settlement
rate of the black market for foreign exchange, a large influencer in the early
financial reform periods.

During the mid-1980s, State Administration of

Exchange Control, SAEC, was delegated the task of setting up limited number
of foreign exchange adjustment centers, also known as “swap centers,” where
foreign trade investors could trade foreign exchange and Renminbi at rates
between designated parameters (Wang, n.d.). To stabilize the exchange rate,
the swap center rates began to shift closer to black market rates, further
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devaluing the Renminbi. State investment was additionally promoted for
export industries in a measure to increase exports. In 1994, China Foreign
Exchange Trading System based in Shanghai, gradually replaced swap centers
(Henderson, 1999).
China’s reformist economy had let it survive the Asian financial crises
of the later 1990s, and generate much international attention and diplomatic
importance in its ability to stabilize its financial market. Despite the Asian
crisis in 1997 that showed the devaluation of Asian currency, China and the
Chinese government were able to maintain level constancy of the Renminbi.
China was able to avoid large financial distress faced by Asian counterparts
partly because of insulation of account surpluses, capital account controls, and
large foreign exchange reserves (Huang, 2002). Maintaining the value of the
Renminbi was politically and economically employed as a tool to increase
China’s image of international responsibility and economic stability. China’s
relatively stable currency value in comparison to flailing Asian economies
allowed China to gain valuable export market share over its Asian
counterparts. To fully leverage this opportunity, the Chinese government
additionally released orders to state banks to financial support state-owned
enterprises and to focus on exports. In 1998, China cut interest rates three
times to reduce domestic costs for exporter operations, another strategy to
increase domestic export (Hamilton, 2000).
Since 1995, the Chinese government has held and continues to hold
the Renminbi at approximately $8.28 against the dollar, and shows no
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inclination to adjust the pegging policy in the near future (Central Intelligence
Agency, 2005). Strategically, China has established competencies in pegging
the Renminbi against the U.S. dollar, and is unlikely to risk destabilizing the
current economic role of the Renminbi, though consistent pressures from
foreign countries, particularly the U.S., has been put on the central
government (Blustein, 2005).

Financial Institutions’ Challenges
Domestic bank’s competitiveness faces several problems; amongst
them are the low profitability, poor asset quality from high non-performing
loans together with inadequate capital, and impaired ability to control loan
quality (OECD, 2002).

These problems are partly due to accumulated

burdens arising from past inefficiencies, and ongoing weaknesses in
governance and operating capabilities. The lack of freedom and complex
hierarchical procedural issues that coincides with close government
coordination is also a hindrance.

These issues also undermine the

effectiveness with which banks are able to allocate credit and to exercise
financial discipline over enterprises, posing potential risks to financial
stability.

Financial Institutions as a Reform Tool
Only 0.6 percent of the total number of enterprises created between
1988 and 1996 has been put into bankruptcy despite continuously poor
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financial results, which signified the government’s allowance for low
mortality rate of these companies (OECD, 2002). In addition, there exists a
strong anti-creditor prejudice, especially against banks, despite provision in
the bankruptcy law that give creditors a priority on the remaining assets
(Lardy, 1998). Usually, remaining assets are only enough to cover employee
rehabilitation expenses, which in turn infers that the rate of recovery on initial
loans by domestic banks is extremely low.
Three interrelated problems emerged out of the early banking reform
systems to constrict development of financial institutions within China
because of its use by the government as a complementary tool for industry
reform.

First, firms increasingly borrowed to finance purchase of new

equipment, productive assets, production inputs, wage costs, and social
services for their employees, at times even to meet pension and tax obligations
(Yeung, 2004). Indebtedness far exceeded the assets of state-owned firms.
State-owned enterprises built up large unfunded pension liabilities, unpaid tax
liabilities, and inter-enterprise debts, which are triangular debts partly within
the state-owned enterprise sector (Lardy, 1998). The government assumed the
burden of subsidizing growing losses through fiscal subsidies and “policy
loans,” which were loans taken from the state-owned banking system (Lardy,
1998). Financial institutions were in essence a form of budgetary fund for
state-related operations and enterprises. The early 1990s absorbed 10 percent
or more of gross domestic product each year for these direct and indirect
subsidies (World Bank, 1995). The strategy of preventing the emergence of
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economic failures was accomplished largely by deferring industrial
restructuring, a process financed by the buildup of huge financial liability on
the part of state-owned firms (Jefferson & Singh, 1999). Consequently, stateowned firms are predisposed to become insolvent. Second, state-owned banks
and financial institutions extended loans without consideration of financial
deepening. In a market economy, an increase of the size of the financial
sector, as measure by assets, which in China’s case are largely loans, relative
to real output can indicate financial deepening (Brealey, & et. al., 2004).
Given the large percentage of nonperforming loans, and China’s ratio of
money to gross domestic product was over 100 percent in 1996, a crisis will
occur should money in savings accounts decrease and banks lose their
liquidity (State Statistical Bureau, 1997).

Third, decreasing government

revenues between 1978, at 31.2 percent, and 1995, at 10.7 percent, signified
that the state was increasingly unable to finance normal governmental
expenditures from state budget (State Statistical Bureau, 1996). Financial
institutions limited reserves would go to fund state expenditures when a need
arise.
After 1993, the Chinese government realized the high amount nonperforming loans, NPLs, to which the People’s Bank of China reacted by
significantly reducing both its subsidies to state-owned enterprises and its
loans to commercial banks (Lardy, 1998). According to the OECD (2002),
subsidies to the state-owned enterprises were reduced from 7.5 percent of
GDP in 1992 to 2.3 percent in 1994, and to less than 1 percent after 1995.
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From 1994 to 1998, loans from the People’s Bank of China to state
commercial banks grew at an average annual rate of 6 percent as opposed to
20 percent before 1994 (Chinese Financial Annual, 1998). The government’s
subsequent decision to turn the big four state banks into commercial banks
and cleanse balance sheets made the banks more conservative, due the fact
that bad loans were now less likely to be financed by new loans from the
People’s Bank of China (OECD, 2002).
These initial steps were followed by a series of reforms to the evolving
banking system. The Chinese government required the four state commercial
banks to increase their profits and “clean up balance sheets” by restricting bad
debt (De Brower, & Pupphavesa, 1998). With new contexts and restrictions,
the four state banks were increasingly unwilling to lend money to companies
that were heavily in debt. During the course of 1997, over two thousand large
and medium sized Shanghai state companies were audited and ranked
according to their financial situation; to which they were then issued “loan
certificates” summarizing their credit track record, allowing for proof of
documentation when making new credit requests to banks (De Brower, &
Pupphavesa, 1998). These initial reforms helped to stabilize the previously
heavily indebted and high non-performing loaning during the Asian crisis.

Public sector impacts.
Public sector is essential during the macroeconomic fluctuations of the
economy, particularly when a deficit, or low borrowing level, occurs.
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Problems of the budget deficit can be alleviated by the sale of treasury bonds,
but the broader problem of public sector deficit being at unsustainable level
over gross domestic output have multiple implications (Stoll, 1998). China’s
high public sector deficit reduces the flow of savings available to finance nonstate investment, leading them to rely on informal credit markets,
reinvestment of profits, and closely allied state-owned firms for financing
(Jefferson & Singh, 1999). State-owned enterprises, however, refrain from
extending excessive indirect credit in case they create new competition in
their core businesses; contributing to the problem of insufficient resources for
the public sector. The need to sustain loss-making state-owned enterprises
influences bank lending by limiting the ability to vary interest rates to reflect
risk, which implies that cost of credit varies widely among borrowers of
comparable credit worthiness.
Due to the non-recoverable borrowing by state firms, the public sector
deficit accumulated over time, reducing the net worth of government assets
below the optimum level of efficient economies. Under such premises, as the
government debt rises above share of output, investors will lose confidence in
the ability of the government to finance its expenditures on a non-inflationary
basis and will demand higher interest to compensate for the anticipated
increase in inflation.

The unpredictability and lack of guarantee in a

commercial environment had prevented Chinese banks to operate fully on
commercial terms until borrowing behavior fundamentally changes.
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Banking profitability.
Chinese banks’ profitability has declined steadily; in 1999, reported
profits before tax of the four largest state-owned central banks ranged between
slightly negative as a ratio of total assets to 0.33 percent (OECD, 2002). The
Bank of China lost monopolistic offering of deposits and loans denominated
in foreign currencies and settlement of foreign trade transactions, and other
types of foreign exchange business; falling to two-fifths of the banks’ share of
the market in foreign trade settlement (Lardy, 1998).
Reported profits are also a poor measurement tool because of habitual
practices in overstating profits. This includes sub-par practices in accounting
for the accrual of interest on loans, which are below international standards.
Profit figures are also overstated by relatively low charges for loan provisions,
meaning that banks are allowed to set aside only 1 percent of total loans as
provisions. Under international standards, 1 percent is low, and particularly
unrealistic given the indebted financial condition of China’s banks. Another
overstating profits practice is that Chinese banks are allowed to take very
limited write-offs on bad loans (“China and the WTO: perspective on a
changing environment,” 2005).
Low level of profits is also attributed to inefficiencies that lead to
excessively high costs in bank operations. Extensive branching of small and
poorly located offices, with occasional overstaffing makes it economically
costly (Yeung, 2004). Bank costs are further inflated by the relatively high
turnover tax rate imposed on bank loans; prior to 2001 it was at 8 percent, to
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which lowered to 7 percent in 2001 (OECD, 2002). A last major influential
factor to low profitability is the use of low or outdated technology, which
further contributes to relatively low productivity in bank operations at the
branches.

Credit policy reform.
After initial steps at reform, and the Asian crisis, the Chinese
government put much emphasis in stabilizing the already fine balance
between credit and savings. Bank loans to state-owned and public sector were
given out sparingly in order to reduce the social costs of transition; waiting for
companies to be privatized, merged, or put into bankruptcy. Bank lending,
which was growing at an annual pace of more than 20 percent in the summer
of 2004, has diminished to 10 percent in March of 2005 (“Finance and
economics,” 2005).
Non-performing loans of banks have inflated national public loans;
another inefficiency of the financial system that has not been solved. In the
late 1990s, OECD estimated approximately 50 percent or more of the total
loans of state-owned central banks are national public loans (2002). China’s
banks have low levels of capital to cushion against national public loans, low
profitability, and high national public loans; consummating into a decreased
ability of Chinese banks to compete against increasing foreign competition.
Financial weaknesses of the banks directly limit the capacity of institutions to
invest in improvements in their capabilities, to raise funds in domestic or
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foreign financial markets, and to form alliances with foreign banks. These
conditions tend to also weaken internal incentives to asses and monitor credit
risks.
Since the inception of new banking law in 1996, authorities have taken
several initiatives to improve bank-lending standards (Chan & Rotenberg,
1999).

Direct quotas on bank lending were abolished and replaced with

required ratios of assets to liabilities and asset liability system to regulate
aggregate credit. Banks were required to establish a strict separation between
loan origination and loan approval, something previously foreign in practice
and the source of many fraudulent practices.

The government has

strengthened the accountability by making higher-level bank offices
responsible for lower branch’s compliance with lending standards, and by
making lending officers and their senior management accountable for new bad
loans (Yeung, 2004). These measures reinforced earlier policy banks creation
to take responsibility over government directed or other preferential lending,
previously carried out by the commercial banks.

Such reforms have

substantially reduced obvious government direction of credit, and have
significantly improved lending standards and credit quality. Though, noncommercial consideration continue to influence lending decisions to a lesser
degree and through more indirect channels, state-owned central banks were
allocated minimum quotas for matching lending to infrastructure projects
financed by the government’s special bond issues in 1998 (Yeung, 2004).
Continued operation of numerous loss-producing state-owned enterprises
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unable to service loans suggests that banks continue to provide working
capital to firms that would not meet basic standards of creditworthiness.
Government allowance for such enterprises should decrease in order to
improve market efficiency of the financial system.

Asset management & equity.
In 1998, the central government launched a program of recapitalization
of the four biggest state commercial banks, which has helped the biggest stateowned enterprises to reduce their debt. The program allowed banks to writeoff from the balance sheet certain non-performing loans made to state-owned
enterprises. Corresponding loans to the state-owned enterprises were taken
over by four liquidating companies created for the purpose; China Cinda,
China Huarong, China Great Wall Asset, and China Oriental (OECD, 2002).
The liquidating, or asset management, companies take over assets and are
responsible for selling the assets. The difference between the initial value of
the asset and the amount recovered is that the recovery or asset sale is
financed, if properly implemented, by state bonds (Brealey, & et. al., 2004).
Since 2002, the program has contributed to a substantial reduction of
the debt of the largest state-owned enterprises, and has boosted the
profitability of the public sector (“SASAC sets deadline for debt-to-equity
swap”, 2005). It represents initiative steps towards resolving the structural
problem that links state-owned enterprises investment performance and the
evolution of state commercial bank lending practices. Asset management
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companies have not concentrated on new loans but have concentrated on old
loans that are difficult to recover, giving state commercial banks leeway in
efforts on reforming credit lending practices on the new loans made since the
mid-1990s, as well as cleansing portfolios of non-performing investments.
The Chinese government has made clear indications of letting asset
management companies actively play a supervisory role and focus on debt
resolution and restructuring of state-owned enterprises. Asset management
companies are entitled to trade assets among themselves to become larger
creditors and concentrate their effort on more limited number of enterprises
(OECD, 2002).
Asset management companies, however face several challenges. Most
asset management companies entering boards of major state-owned
enterprises are unable to maximize their influence and control the actions of
the managers, and/or to censure them for several reasons. Firstly, there is an
asymmetry of information provided to the different parties.

The lack of

transparency in the accounting system and poor functioning of board of
directors allows state-owned managers to continue to control access to
strategic information on firms.

Secondly, there is a large number of

companies under the program, resulting in the handling to billions of
Renminbi assets, and tens of thousands of debtor companies. Overload of
duties and responsibilities disperses concentration of the asset management
companies.

A third corresponding deterrent is that asset management

companies lack sufficient supply of human resources and skills to play a
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strategic role in state-owned enterprises governance; including financial
management and technology skills. Lastly, according to statutes that created
asset management companies, they lack effective shareholder power, and are
subject to negotiation with the central and local bureaucracies in charge of
large state-owned enterprises, and thereby undercutting their power to force
restructuring of the state-owned enterprises. China Huarong and China Cinda,
some of the more notable asset management companies have difficulty
dealing with strong conglomerates such as Monkey King Group and
Zhengzhou Baiwen in restructuring plans. Both state-owned enterprises tried
to escape control of asset management companies by either petitioning for
bankruptcy to resist restructuring plans or committing actions to resist
bankruptcy procedures and shutdown (World Bank, 2000).

Improving competitiveness & foreign bank involvement.
As evidenced by the relatively low rates of capacity utilization in
many branches of Chinese industry in the mid-1990s, lack of competition
from non-state sector to encourage production contributes to the lagging
economic performance of many state-owned firms (Lardy, 1998). Previously,
foreign banks assets were insignificantly small compared with assets of
domestic financial institutions. In conjunction with protecting domestic firms,
role of foreign financial institutions in China is limited because of the
constraint on services permitted and geographic areas these foreign banks are
licensed to operate.
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The Chinese government in the 1990s acted on initiatives of reforming
the domestic currency business, marking a step toward giving foreign banks
the awaited right to take Renminbi deposits and make Renminbi-denominated
loans (Lardy, 1998).

To assure domestic risk is minimized, the Chinese

government set strict restrictions on foreign banks. Firstly, foreign banks may
carry out business dealings only with Chinese firms that are joint-venturing or
have foreign-related business operations (Benewick, & et. al., 1995). This
proved to be problematic for foreign banks due to the small number of
foreign-related Chinese firms at the time. In addition, this limitation made it
difficult to establish ties with those firms that were not already expanding ties
to foreign business. Secondly, foreign banks are limited in providing full
services of the domestic currency business. A stake in the profitable credit
card business was not available for foreign banks. Thirdly, foreign banks
must relinquish right to preferential tax rate, to which was a capital and
opportunity loss for foreign banks (Brahm, 1996).

Finally, to prevent

unnecessary integration and protection of domestic money market, the
Chinese government limited the number of joint and foreign banks authorized
to conduct Renminbi businesses (Lardy, 1998).
Prior to large financial reform of the 1990s, foreign banks faced strict
policy, geographical, and customer limitations, which were designed to
protect state commercial banks from foreign competition. In 1999, foreign
banks accounted for only approximately 2 percent of the total bank assets in
China (OECD, 2002). Following China’s WTO commitments, several key
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restrictions on foreign bank operations will be phased out within a five year
plan.

In late 2004, China Banking Regulatory Commission, CBRC,

announced steps to improve foreign banks’ access in China’s domestic
market, primarily by offering Renminbi-denominated banking services in
Beijing, Kunming, Xiamen, Ningbo, Shenyang, Shantou, and Xian
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2004).
Also according to China’s WTO agreements, the country must allow
foreign banks to issue Renminbi-denominated credit cards by 2007, to which
the Chinese government seems active in abiding (Economist Intelligence Unit,
2002a). After accession into the WTO, China has allowed foreign banks to
issue credit cards domestically, giving the right for foreign banks to do fullservice banking for Chinese companies (Areddy, 2004). Foreign banks are
able to offer foreign currency-denominated credit cards to Chinese civilians
with foreign currency-denominated salaries. And already foreign banks are
taking advantage of the opportunity to expand presence in China.

In

September, Canada's Bank of Nova Scotia secured regulatory approval to
increase its stake in Xian City Commercial Bank to 12.5 percent (“China
finance,” 2005). In November, Commonwealth Bank of Australia announced
it had reached an agreement to buy 11 percent of Jinan City Commercial
Bank, China's eighth-largest city commercial bank, and with the option to
increase to 20 percent ownership (“China finance,” 2005). Foreign banks
have competitive advantages in many areas: good asset quality, superior skills
and technology, international expertise, overseas networks and access to
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diverse global markets, flexible management structures, and good risk control
and assessment.

However, foreign banks lack a substantial comparative

advantage with China; the ability to establish networks with domestic
enterprises and customers.

CBRC stated that by the end of 2006, all

geographical restrictions on local currency banking will be removed
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2004).

Creating a Modern Financial System Up to International Standards
China’s banking system has undergone significant changes in the last
two decades. In the course of its transformation from a mono-bank system
typical of centrally-planned economies, to an increasingly diversified, multilayered system comprising of central bank and growing number of domestic
and foreign commercial banks, China’s banking system is now among the
world’s largest, particularly in relation to gross domestic product, GDP
(OECD, 2002).

Parts of the banking system are comparable in the

sophistication and market orientation to those found in other emerging
economies and the banking system is rapidly modernizing further, while some
parts are still heavily influenced by past centralized system.

Lending Policy
After decades of extending loans largely at the will of political
agendas, Chinese banks have not accumulated sufficient experience in
commercial banking.

Credit policy standards continue to be lax, and
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personnel lack appropriate credit training (Lardy, 1998). Civilian borrowing
has increased dramatically in the past decade, surpassing in growth rate of
enterprise borrowing (“Borrowing accelerates,” 2003). The Chinese central
bank has tried to address such issues by limiting simultaneous borrowing, and
greater financial disclosure of borrowers.

However, the central bank is

limited in regulatory and supervisory abilities and thus can not offer strong
leadership position to transition China’s current state to a commercial banking
system.
China has only just initiated the institutional transformation that is
required to allocate capital more efficiently.

The creations of new

commercially-oriented banks are better equipped to meet the needs of a
modern economy.

However, the state has under-capitalized these new

financial institutions by insulating state banks against competition, and
consequently diminishing new commercial banks’ catalytic role in reforming
China’s financial structure. The pervasive problem of new commercial banks
is the lack of controls on lending policies. During the reform era, banks
loaned randomly to enterprises; in the past decade, financial institutions have
moved to lending indiscriminately to individual consumers. Lending to state
sectors enterprises has decreased in proportion over the years, largely due to
the decreased number, and has freed up banks to transfer capital investments
in more private enterprises (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002b).
The reforms of the late 1990s contributed to an increased pace of
restructuring, constituting an important break in the conservative philosophies
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Inefficiently and misallocated funding of state-managed

enterprises, high market demand, and consumer optimism contributed to the
difficulty of choosing profitable companies. However, it was an improvement
from the 1980s, where policy of granting loans to loss-making companies for
purchases of production equipment or other costly investment projects was in
effect (Lardy, 1998).
Debt un-payment consequences have been few and hard to enforce,
and continue to be a hazard in the stability of asset to liability ratio of
financial institutions within China. A more defined separation of commercial
from policy lending needs to be in place to increase independence of financial
institutions in regards to political interference in lending decisions.
Culture of credit loaning of banks and loan officers is still socially
networked.

Despite absence of explicit government-directed credit, close

relationships among banks, major industrial customers, and government exist.
To solve the difficulty of containing imprudent lending relies on changing
commercial behavior and not only institutional and structural reform.

Intermediation
As mentioned previously, China’s banking system lacks efficient
intermediation. Efficient financial systems contribute positively to economic
growth and stabilization, especially through the allocation of funds to highest
returning projects, increasing marginal productivity of capital, and
maximizing usage of capital resources by continuous utilization in
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investments. In China, these banks are vital for two reasons. First, the
Chinese population for many social reasons holds confidence in the banking
system and supplies banks with enough equity to finance debt and liability, as
well as provide much of the investment capital needed. Much attributed to
this reason, China has not suffered widespread bank failures or seizure of
savings from the state through inflation tax (Boyd, Chang, & Smith, 2004).
Second, the variety of financial assets has grown slowly, remaining
concentrated in cash savings (Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking,
1997). Banks, thus, have opportunities to create capital assets and credit
cooperatives.
With the increase of foreign involvement, Chinese banks’ role as
intermediaries between domestic enterprises and foreign investors are
progressively important. Domestic banks can leverage their social networks
and familiarity with the business environment as competitive advantages. In
addition, more diverse intermediation will give China’s banking system
opportunities to gather skills and experience.

Measurement and Transparency
Overall, most commentators agree that the quality of the Chinese
accounting and auditing framework is quite good compared to other emerging
or transitioning countries. However, transparency and disclosure practices are
not up to international standards. Financial management and reporting are
plagued with fraud and pervasive irregularities. Particularly strong examples
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of the scale of this problem are the recent cases of financial mismanagement
of trust and investment companies. In 2002, an estimated of nearly half of the
1,500 listed Chinese companies engages in some form of accounting
irregularities (Leggit, 2002).
Measurement of the public sector deficit served to indicate a broad
assessment of resources requirement of the state in its entirety of agencies and
enterprises. The indicators include borrowing to finance government’s budget
deficit; specific instances are the sale of government bonds and borrowing by
the treasury from central bank, state-owned enterprises issues of bonds and
stocks to the public, and borrowing from the banking system (Lardy, 1998).
Bank information disclosure is an essential part of financial transparency and
reform. Chinese banks are progressing gradually from "selective" information
disclosure to substantive transparency (OECD, 2002).

A mandatory

disclosure mechanism is being constructed with various measures to improve
the financial strength of major banks in China.
Compared to other transition and emerging economies, China’s
accounting and auditing are relatively proficient, but transparency and
disclosure practices are still behind international standards.
standards in China are set by the Ministry of Finance.

Accounting
It’s Advisory

Committee, including representatives of the accounting profession, academics,
and State Audit Committee has the authorization to review draft legislation,
though they have no role in preparing draft policies (United Nations, 1999).
This contrasts with most advanced market economies around the world where
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much of the accounting policies are directly attributed to the active
accountancy industry. Partly due to this approach, the accounting industry
and profession, as well as the consequent implementation of the standards are
weak.

Ministry of Finance has made clear indications of bringing the

accounting standards up to international level, and in 1999 adopted new
accounting standards following western examples (Chen & Yuan, 2004).
Unlike previous accounting standards, the set of standards adopted in 1999 is
an accounting disclosure and policy system set effectively by enterprises
instead of the government.
In contrast to accounting standards set by the government, audit
standards are set by a professional organization, the Chinese Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, CICPA (Chen & Yuan, 2004). The CICPA
requires more independence from the state; currently it is headed by the
deputy Finance minister, and has been weak in creating the requisite guidance
and adopting training programs that would help lift the implementation
standards (Chan & Rotenberg, 1999). The big four accounting firms of the
U.S. have audited China’s banking sector as well as a few firms that have
been involved in international capital markets, but these foreign banks have
not been allowed a competitive presence in the domestic corporate sector
(Chen & Yuan, 2004).
Non-financial

disclosure,

including

ownership,

control,

and

governance-related disclosure are also lacking, somewhat correlated with the
advanced black market and illegitimacy of many businesses in China and Asia
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(De Brower & Pupphavesa, 1998). Transparency and disclosure reform still
remains in its early stages and the concept of continuous disclosure of items
that materially affect the business is foreign to many.
In 2002, the Chinese government disclosed new requirements for
improving accountancy transparency, in an effort to bring regulation of the
banking sector up to international standards. New regulation requires annual
releases of financial reports, including financial statements, balance sheets and
equity positions, including banks to have financial records audited annually by
an accredited firm.

Regulatory provisions for online-banking were also

established. People’s Bank of China, PBoC, required all banks offering online
services for the first time to file applications with PBoC prior, and must report
quarterly its business details (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002a).
Although recent disclosure of negative information has not had
significant influence on public confidence, foreign investment
and bank management, the necessity of enhanced disclosure
and its increasing importance in the long run is substantive
(Chen, 2003).

Strategies to Improve Domestic Banking
Central government, supervisory officials, and banks, have made
strong efforts to correct weaknesses of domestic banks. Over the last several
years, state-owned central banks have closed smaller outlying branches and
transferring their business to larger city branches and headquarters; between
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1997 and 2000, nearly 21,000 offices were closed (OECD, 2002). Large
efforts on cutting surplus staff and maximizing productivity have been
implemented, mostly by investing extensively in equipment and other
facilities to modernize and improve efficiency of bank operations (World
Bank, 2000). In addition to cost cutting, China banks’ business strategies
have focused on two objectives; improving credit quality, and diversifying
and strengthening products in areas of greatest comparative advantage
(Yeung, 2004).

Strong encouragement from supervisory authorities gave

banks empowerment; banks have tightened internal controls on lending,
upgraded internal accounting and information technology systems. These
changes are critical because of rapid shift of China’s enterprises in response to
trade and investment liberalization.

Effective and forward-looking credit

assessment capabilities for China’s banks must be improved.
China’s domestic commercial banks possess important competitive
advantages in raising deposits, servicing customers, and having close relations
and knowledge of their clientele. Close ties with the government, primarily in
their role in financing state-owned enterprises and government infrastructure
projects present advantages of increased capability as a result of extensive
opening of the economy to international markets and protection from entry of
foreign-invested enterprises.

Cash management, foreign exchange, and other

services for commercial customers should develop further so as to improve
profitability and enhance banks’ ability to retain most profitable enterprise
clients. One of the largest areas for growth is the exponential expansion for
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housing and home ownership, automobile purchases, and other consumer
durables. Issues with profitability may be appeased by tapping into this area
of growth.
To strengthen competitiveness, domestic banks should exploit their
key advantages of the close relationships and knowledge about domestic
enterprises and households. Special efforts should be made to form alliances
among domestic banks or with foreign banks to exploit their complementary
advantages, which Chinese banks seem to be already taking the initiative, as
can be seen from recent partnering. Bringing in a foreign partner who can
introduce better risk management and other systems and practices which it
would otherwise take years to develop and master can produce almost instant
benefits (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005).

In order to stimulate the

transformation of domestic banking system, China should continue to utilize
the role of foreign financial institutions, and eliminate their limitations in
domestic financial system.

Conclusions
A central part of China's success has been its gradualist stance toward
economic and political reform. In contrast with Russia's unsuccessful shock
therapy, China managed to liberalize slowly without losing control of the legal
system and the political process. The often-condemned suppression of the
Tiananmen Square student uprising in 1989 was a crucial part of this
approach. Had the government yielded to the student protests, the likely result
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would have been political chaos and poorer economic performance (Barro,
2003).
China’s financial system has made important progress in recent years.
The stock market has expanded impressively since its inception in the early
1990s, reaching a market capitalization of more the 50 per cent of GDP by
2001 (OECD, 2002).

In 2004, China’s stock market has developed into

Asia’s third biggest with more than 1,300 companies 4 trillion Renminbi of
market capitalization and more than 70 million stock traders (“Sustainable
growth needed for China’s stock market,” 2004). The financial supervisory
and regulatory structure have also been thoroughly reorganized and
rationalized along lines consistent with international best practices.
Despite progress, the financial system still has inadequacies in
carrying out several basic functions in the economy. Savings mobilization has
been relatively effective, but credit lacks proper allocation practices. Stateowned enterprises still receive bulk of the funds allocated by the formal
financial system, while non-state enterprises receive much lower share than is
warranted by their importance in the overall economy. The need to sustain
loss-making state-owned enterprises continues to influence bank lending;
largely by the limited ability to vary interest rates to reflect risk, implying that
cost of credit varies widely among borrowers of comparable credit worthiness.
Habit

of

government-mandated

lending

and

weak

contract

enforcement and bankruptcy regimes has created a distorted credit culture,
which banks have limited incentives and ability to maintain strict lending
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standards and enforce loan contracts. The weakness of discipline has been
aggravated by excess and inefficient investment behavior of many enterprises,
which has been inherited by the modern Chinese economy.
The government continues to struggle in sustaining adequate job
growth for millions of workers laid off from state-owned enterprises,
migrants, and new entrants to the work force; reducing corruption and other
economic crimes; and keeping afloat the large state-owned enterprises, many
of which had been shielded from competition by subsidies and had been
losing the ability to pay full wages and pensions (Central Intelligence Agency,
2005).
Critical concerns that China’s financial infrastructure will not support
rapid growth and consumption of the 21st century have put considerable
attention in decreasing the economic growth.

Government’s careful

application of fiscal policy to restrain temporary exponential growth has been
successful. Fixed asset investments have decelerated to 26 percent growth, as
compared to 50 percent the previous year (Chipman, 2005). Accompanying
these early signs of success have also generated a renewed sense of
confidence in the Chinese government and its commitment to dealing with
important economic issues and to building multi-lateral, open-business
relationships in the worldwide community (Chipman, 2005).

However,

temporary successes may not be enough to impede the pursuant problems with
rising unemployment, deflation from overinvestment in manufacturing
capacity, a banking system struggling with non-performing loans, and a
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growing deficit caused by government efforts to keep real GDP at the range of
seven to eight percent (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002b).
These weaknesses in the financial system are partly a reflection of the
fact that China is still a developing country. It also reflects the fact that
evolution of the financial system has lagged behind real economic progress.
China’s transition to a market economy needs the creation of a modern
banking system, one that will meet accepted international accounting
standards.

The implementation of a hybrid modern commercial banking

system in China reflects the understanding by Chinese leaders of the
underlying structural problems in the banking system.

After China’s

accession into the WTO, the central government remains committed to
meeting obligations with the biggest obstacles being enforcement mechanisms
at the local level (“China and the WTO: perspective on a changing
environment,” 2005).

Accession to the World Trade Organization helps

stabilize, if not strengthen, China’s ability to maintain growth rates but puts
additional pressure on the hybrid system of political controls and growing
market influences.
Being the country that supplies the largest labor force and consuming
population, and having an economy increasingly exposed to market forces,
China has large effects on the current world market. The complexity of
certain factors of China’s economic system require an identification of
political, social, and economic structures and practices, as well as the
inefficiencies that may produce problematic imbalances in China’s economy.
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Capital resources and structures, being the groundwork for economic
development, has been particularly important in that inefficiencies regarding
how capital is processed and allocated are now more obvious. In association,
the hybrid system of a large government enterprise sector transitioning into a
market economy, in which China has successfully built its reputation, has
shown the importance of managing state enterprises.

China’s hybrid

capitalistic progress has given credibility to a different form of capitalistic
development.

China now needs to establish the basic institutional and

regulatory reforms to meet international requirements.
Though findings have largely revealed cyclic problems in which
certain areas interact in mutually reinforcing ways to impede progress,
particularly involving weaknesses of the state-owned enterprises and banking
system, there is also a less prominent issue of business mentality in China.
There exists a strong underlying cultural ideology that makes true separation
of policy and commercial still remote. Though there are institutional and
structural reform that may speed China’s transformation, detaching
fundamental social-political-economic aspect of Chinese business behavior
require decades if not a half a century of shifting from social norms and
communication networks of traditional Chinese business culture to that of
market capitalism. It is precisely this reliance on personal networking and
close interrelation between distinct areas that makes China a unique specimen
in capitalistic reform. It is important to identify and understand the structural
and institutional inefficiencies of China’s growing economy, but in order to

INEFFICIENCIES OF CHINA’S FINANCIAL SYSTEM

48

reduce China’s long-term growth uncertainties, additional concentration needs
to be put on the socio-economic factors. Before expanding on the advanced
institutional and regulatory reforms to the likes of western economies, China’s
next step is to implement socially reformative initiatives to change the
behavior of its consuming public, highly personalized-business-dealing
commercial class, and commercially-affiliated politicians. Those that propose
direct transition in reforming China’s economic and capital development to
that equivalent of western examples will need to acknowledge the existence
and influences of these underlying cultural factors on China’s economic
progress as well as its more obvious structural inefficiencies. China’s current
approach should be to reform structures and institutions to meet international
standards and reduce major internal inefficiencies, predominately in its
policies toward state-owned enterprises and the banking system. However,
China, being uniquely differentiated by its culture, history, and people, may
develop its own capitalistic regime without following the exact steps of other
established economies.

INEFFICIENCIES OF CHINA’S FINANCIAL SYSTEM

49

References
Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking 1997. (1997). Beijing: China
Financial Publishing House.
Areddy, J.T. (2004, June 8). Industrial China goes into banking [Electronic
version]. Wall Street Journal, A12. Retrieved April 18, 2004, from Proquest
database Web site:
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=648425061&SrchMode=1&si
d=5&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=
1114448602&clientId=3739
Barale, L.A. (1989, October 15). China before Tiananmen: the economic
background to a political disaster [Electronic version]. Wall Street Journal,
A26. Retrieved May 21, 2005, from Proquest database Web site:
http://proquest.umi.com.libezproxy2.syr.edu/pqdweb?index=6&did=350078&
SrchMode=1&sid=2&Fmt=6&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VN
ame=PQD&TS=1117125630&clientId=3739
Barrow, R.J. (2002, September 30). China’s slow yet steady march to reform
[Electronic version]. Business Week, 3801, 28. Retrieved May 21, 2005 from
Proquest database Web site:
http://proquest.umi.com.libezproxy2.syr.edu/pqdweb?index=2&did=1995136
31&SrchMode=1&sid=2&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&
VName=PQD&TS=1117125630&clientId=3739
Baum, R. (1994). Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng
Xiaoping, p. 36-57. New Jersey: Princeton Unversity Press.
Benewick, R., & Wingrove, P. (1995). China in the 1990s. Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press.
Blecher, M. (2000). The Dengist Period: The triumphs and Crises of
Structural Reform, 1979 to the Present. In C. Hudson (Ed.), The China
Handbook: Prospects onto the 21st Century (pp. 19-37). New York:
AMACOM.
Blustein, P. (2005, May 11). Putting pressure on China’s peg Washington Post
Online Web site: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpyn/content/article/2005/05/10/AR2005051001460.html
Borrowing accelerates [Electronic version]. (2003, May). The Banker, 12.
Retrieved March 28, 2005, from Proquest database Web site:
http://proquest.umi.com.libezproxy2.syr.edu/pqdweb?index=0&did=3392147
11&SrchMode=1&sid=20&Fmt=2&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309
&VName=PQD&TS=1117144180&clientId=3739

INEFFICIENCIES OF CHINA’S FINANCIAL SYSTEM

50

Boyd, J.H., Chang, C., & Smith, B.D. (November 2004). Deposit insurance
and bank regulation in a monetary economy: a general equilibrium exposition
[Electronic version]. Retrieved March 28, 2005, from Proquest database Web
site:
http://proquest.umi.com.libezproxy2.syr.edu/pqdweb?index=0&did=6749394
11&SrchMode=1&sid=15&Fmt=2&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309
&VName=PQD&TS=1117143258&clientId=3739
Brahm, L.J. (1996). China as No. 1: The New Superpower Takes Center State.
New York: Butterworth-Heinemann Asia.
Brealey, R.A., Myers, S.C., & Marcus, A.J. (2004). Fundamentals of
Corporate Finance, 4th Edition (pp. 394-414). New York: McGraw Hill/Irwin.
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (2005). The World Fact Book: China
[Electronic version]. Retrieved April 17, 2005, from CIA online Web site:
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos
Chan, L.M.W., & Rotenberg, W. (1999). Accounting, accounting education,
and economic reform in the people’s republic of China [Electronic version].
International Studies of Management & Organization, 29(3), 37-54. Retrieved
April 20, 2005, from Proquest database Web site:
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=8&did=52745560&SrchMode=1&sid
=1&Fmt=4&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1
115704157&clientId=3739
Chen, J. (2003, May). Bank information disclosure in China: Evolution and
enhancement [Electronic version]. The Banking Law Journal, 120(5), 417.
Retrieved March 26, 2005, from Proquest database Web site:
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=8&did=345836611&SrchMode=1&si
d=1&Fmt=2&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=
1113663903&clientId=3739
Chen, K.C.W., & Yuan, H.Q. (2004, July). Earnings management and capital
resource allocation: evidence from China’s accounting based regulation of
rights issues [Electronic version]. The Accounting Review, 79(3), 645-665.
Retrieved April 17, 2005, from Proquest database Web site:
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=672946001&SrchMode=1&si
d=1&Fmt=6&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=
1115704156&clientId=3739
Cheng, S. (2003, April 24). Screening the revolution [Electronic version]. Far
Eastern Economic Review, 166(16), 52-54. Retrieved May 18, 2005, from
Proquest database Web site:
http://proquest.umi.com.libezproxy2.syr.edu/pqdweb?index=7&did=3286791

INEFFICIENCIES OF CHINA’S FINANCIAL SYSTEM

51

91&SrchMode=1&sid=5&Fmt=4&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&
VName=PQD&TS=1117122952&clientId=3739
China and the WTO: perspective on a changing environment [Electronic
version]. (2005, February). China Law & Policy. Retrieved April 16, 2005,
from Proquest database Web site:
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=8&did=805805921&SrchMode=1&si
d=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=
1115706283&clientId=3739
China finance: Tie-ups with foreign banks are just getting started [Electronic
version]. (2005, January 26). EIU ViewsWire. Retrieved April 2, 2005, from
Proquest database Web site:
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=2&did=788720361&SrchMode=1&si
d=2&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=
1113664625&clientId=3739
Chinese Financial Annual. (1998). Peking: ZhongGuo JinRong NianJian
BianJi Bu.
China Internet Information Center. (2003, December 31). Renminbi to be
pegged to a basket of currencies. Retrieved on May 7, 2005, from china.org.cn
Web site: http://www.china.org.cn/english/2003/Dec/83712.htm
Chipman, S. (2005, February). Too much, too fast: will China have a soft
landing or no landing at all? [Electronic version]. Mergers and Acquisitions,
40(2), 6-7. Retrieved April 18, 2004 from Proquest database Web site:
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=9&did=795407011&SrchMode=1&si
d=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=
1114445120&clientId=3739
De Brower, G. & Pupphavesa, W. (Eds.). (1998). Asia Pacific Financial
Deregulation. New York: Routledge.
Economist Intelligence Unit. (2002a, August). Finance watch: China
[Electronic version]. Business Asia, 34(16), 7. Retrieved April 18, 2004 from
Proquest database Web site:
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=4&did=152312001&SrchMode=1&si
d=5&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=
1114448602&clientId=3739
Economist Intelligence Unit. (2002b, December). Finance watch: China
[Electronic version]. Business Asia, 34(24), 12. Retrieved April 18, 2004 from
Proquest database Web site:
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=2&did=256227121&SrchMode=1&si

INEFFICIENCIES OF CHINA’S FINANCIAL SYSTEM

52

d=5&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=
1114448602&clientId=3739
Economist Intelligence Unit. (2004, October). China finance: Foreign banks to
receive more market access [Electronic version]. EIU Viewswire. Retrieved
April 18, 2004, from Proquest database Web site:
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=7&did=735863181&SrchMode=1&si
d=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=
1114457739&clientId=3739
Economist Intelligence Unit. (2005, January). China finance: tie-ups with
foreign banks are just getting started [Electronic version]. EIU Viewswire.
Retrieved April 18, 2004, from Proquest database Web site:
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=3&did=788720361&SrchMode=1&si
d=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=
1114457739&clientId=3739
Finance and economics: dim sums; China’s economy [Electronic version].
(2005, August 21). The Economist, 372(8389), 68. Retrieved on March 26,
2005, from Proquest database Web site:
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=1&did=681229531&SrchMode=1&si
d=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=
1113663903&clientId=3739
Hamilton, G.G. (2000). Reciprocity and control. In H.W.C. Yeung & Kris
Olds (Eds.), Globalization of Chinese Firms (pp. 55-74). New York:
Macmillan.
Henderson, C. (1999). China on the Brink: The Myths and Realities of the
World’s Largest Market. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Huang, Y.S. (1999). Inflation and Investment Controls in China: The Political
Economy of Central-Local Relations During the Reform Era. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Huang, Y.P. (2002, November). China’s last steps across the river: enterprise
and banking reforms [Electronic version]. The Journal of Asian Studies, 61(4),
1346-1349. Retrieved on May 21, 2005, from Proquest database Web site:
http://proquest.umi.com.libezproxy2.syr.edu/pqdweb?index=6&did=2814830
51&SrchMode=1&sid=5&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&
VName=PQD&TS=1117134154&clientId=3739
Jefferson, G.H., & Singh, I. (1999). Enterprise Reform in China: Ownership,
Transition, and Performance. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc.

INEFFICIENCIES OF CHINA’S FINANCIAL SYSTEM

53

Lardy, N.R. (1994). China in the World Economy. Washington, D.C.: Institute
for International Economics.
Lardy, N.R. (1998). China’s Unfinished Economic Revolution. Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Lee, H.Y. (1978). The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: A Case
Study. New York: University of California Press.
Leggit, K. (2002, August 7). Charges are filed in landmark Chinese fraud case
– three former executives of a listed store operator accused of hiding losses
[Electronic version]. Wall Street Journal, A12. Retrieved April 18, 2004, from
Proquest database Web site:
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=146789541&SrchMode=1&si
d=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=
1115607381&clientId=3739
Lippit, V.D. (1987). The Maoist Period 1949-78: Mobilizational Collectivism,
Primitive Accumulation, and Industrialization (pp. 106-107). New York:
AMACOM.
Lippit, V.D. (2000). The Maoist Period 1949-78: Mobilizational Collectivism,
Primitive Accumulation, and Industrialization. In C. Hudson (Ed.), The China
Handbook: Prospects onto the 21st Century (pp. 3-18). New York:
AMACOM.
OECD, Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development. (2002).
China in the World Economy: The Domestic Policy Challenges. Paris: OECD.
People’s Bank of China. (2005). Retrieved May 15, 2005, from People’s Bank
of China Online Web site: http://www.pbc.gov.cn
Riskin, C. (1987). China’s Political Economy: The Quest for Development
Since 1949. New York: Oxford University Press.
SASAC sets deadline for debt-to-equity swap [Electronic version]. (2005,
January, 20). SinoCast China Business Daily News, (16), 23. Retrieved March
26, 2005, from Proquest database: http://proquest.umi.com/
State Statistical Bureau. (1996). Statistical Communique on Socio-Economic
Development in 1996 [Electronic version]. Beijing Review, (16), 23. Retrieved
March 26, 2005, from LexisNexis database Web site: http://web.lexisnexis.com/
State Statistical Bureau. (1997 March). Statistical Communique on SocioEconomic Development in 1996 [Electronic version]. China Statistical

INEFFICIENCIES OF CHINA’S FINANCIAL SYSTEM

54

Yearbook 1996 (pp. 223). Retrieved March 26, 2005, from LexisNexis
database Web site: http://web.lexis-nexis.com/
Standard Chartered. (2001, April). China’s banking system in transition
[Electronic version]. Hong Kong Trade Development Council Online,
Economic Forum, Business Intelligence. Retrieved March 26, 2005, from
Web site: http://www.tdctrade.com/econforum/sc/sc010402.htm
Stoll, H.R. (1998). Regulation of financial markets: a focused approach.
Multinational Finance Journal, 2(2), 87-99. Retrieved March 26, 2005, from
Proquest database Web site:
http://proquest.umi.com.libezproxy2.syr.edu/pqdweb?index=2&did=5549742
3&SrchMode=1&sid=2&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&
VName=PQD&TS=1117138569&clientId=3739
Sustainable growth needed for China’s stock market [Electronic version].
(2004, October 7). Retrieved May 20, 2005, from People’s Daily Online Web
site: http://english.people.com.cn/200410/07/eng20041007_159212.html
The struggle of the champions – China’s champions; China’s big companies
[Electronic version]. (2005, January 8). The Economist, 374(8408), 58.
Retrieved May 20, 2005, from Proquest database Web site:
http://proquest.umi.com.libezproxy2.syr.edu/pqdweb?index=6&did=7768895
21&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&
VName=PQD&TS=1117130592&clientId=3739
United Nations. (1999). World Economic and Social Survey 1999: Trends and
Policies in the World Economy. New York: United Nations Reproduction
Section.
Wang, Y.F. (n.d.). Retrieved March 26, 2005, from http://c-faculty.chuou.ac.jp/~toyohal/JSME/pdf03s/03s220-wang.pdf
World Bank. (1995). Meeting the Challenge of Chinese Enterprise Reform.
Washington: World Bank.
World Bank. (2000). Aftereffects of the Asian Crisis, p. 31. Washington:
World Bank.
Yeung, H.W.C. (2004). Chinese Capitalism in a Global Era: Towards hybrid
capitalism. London: Routledge.
Zhang, W.Y. (1999). Development in Chinese corporate finance and its
implication for ownership reform. In G. De Brouwer, G., & W, Pupphavesa,
(Eds.), Asia Pacific Financial Deregulation. London: Routledge.

